My question involves a traffic ticket from the state of: Insanity (CA)
Only (1), (2), (3) & (4) appeal below. Other parts are "under construction."
Overview:
(1) Summary of Facts
(2) Questions Presented
(3) Summary of Arguments
(4) Argument: Lack of Substantial Evidence
(5) Argument: Prejudicial Error {Citing Officer’s Training}
(6) Argument: Prejudicial Error {Informal Discovery Request}
(7) Argument: Prejudicial Error {Denial of Continuance}
(8) Argument: Prejudicial Error {Leading Question about RADAR}
SUMMARY OF FACTS
Preliminary Issues
Before trial, Appellant served an Informal Discovery Request on San Bernardino County’s District Attorney. But it failed to respond. Thereafter, Appellant served Citing Officer’s agency. Most documents were mailed to Appellant. But some were not, including CO’s certifications in RADAR or visual-estimation of speed. Shortly before trial, however, CO presented Appellant with the missing documents. Appellant then requested a one-week continuance for document review. But the Court denied the request. Instead, Appellant (in Pro Per) received a short recess, not only to examine multiple pages of new information, but also to figure out how to use them for cross-examination questions.
The Court subsequently reviewed Appellant’s Informal Discovery Request. One request sought “Names & addresses of prosecution witnesses likely to testify at trial.” CO’s agency’s responded in writing with “none." After reading “none” aloud, the Court pointed at the CO, saying, “That’s him.”
Citation and Trial
Citation Date: XXX
Citing Agency: XXX
Citing Officer: XXX (“CO")
Appellant’s Vehicle: Silver, Nissan Sentra
Trial Date: XXX
Hiding behind a mountain-like structure on I-15N, Citing Officer (“CO”) sat in a stationary patrol unit, using his driver’s side mirror to watch northbound traffic. From a substantial distance, CO saw a northbound “Subject Vehicle” (of unknown characteristics), not only traveling fast in a #3 lane, but also passing several vehicles. CO visually estimated the Subject Vehicle’s speed at 110 m.p.h. Thereafter, he activated rear RADAR, obtaining speeds of 109 m.p.h and 110 m.p.h. Much later, CO stopped a silver, Nissan Sentra, issuing a citation for an infraction violation of Vehicle Code 22348(b): Driving a vehicle at greater than 100 m.p.h. on a Highway.
Under cross examination, CO testified that, although his notes mentioned “1000 ft.,” he had obtained speed measurements of the Subject Vehicle at “probably much greater than 1000 ft.”
CO also admitted a couple of weaknesses. First, his most recent visual-estimation-of-speed training had occurred more than (14) fourteen years before citation date. Second, he lacked training in visual estimation of speed at a distance greater than 900 ft. The Court subsequently trivialized those deficiencies, asserting that the CO had performed many visual estimations of speed as a CHP officer.
CO went on to admit that, before obtaining any speed measurements (whether visual or electronic), he had not identified the Subject Vehicle by its characteristics (color, size, class, etc.).
Appellant then informed the Court that, in obtaining electronic speed readings (of both 109 m.p.h. and 110 m.p.h), CO had used RADAR at least 1000 ft. away. At that distance, the RADAR’s beam covered all lanes of I-15N. Neither the CO nor the Court contested Appellant’s information.
Thereafter, CO admitted he had not testified that (a) the Subject Vehicle had left the #3 lane, (b) had ever spent time in a #4 lane, or (c) had ever moved from the #4 lane to the #3 lane. Finally, CO admitted that Exit #138 was available to the Subject Vehicle.
Appellant went on to present video, showing his silver, Nissan Sentra’s traveling in the #4 lane. The video also showed Appellant’s vehicle’s traveling in the #3 lane (after switching from the #4 lane), without passing any vehicles.
Thereafter, the Court asked (while referring to Appellant’s video), “Is that white speck there you?" “Yes, or it could be from a different stop,” said the CO. The Court then asked, “Did you use RADAR there?" After CO said, “yes," the Court found Appellant guilty of CVC 22348(b).
Questions Presented
I. DID THE COURT CONVICT DEFENDANT OF VEHICLE CODE 22348(B), DESPITE A LACK OF SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE?
II. DID A TRIVIALIZING OF CITING OFFICER’S TRAINING DEFICIENCIES CONSTITUTE PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY THE COURT?
III. DID A CLAIM THAT “NONE” MEANT “THE CITING OFFICER” CONSTITUTE PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY THE COURT?
IV. DID A DENIAL OF A CONTINUANCE FOR DOCUMENT REVIEW CONSTITUTE PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY THE COURT?
V. DID A LEADING QUESTION ABOUT RADAR CONSTITUTE PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY THE COURT?
Summary of Argument
First, the Court erred in convicting defendant of CVC 22348(b), since no substantial evidence supported that finding. As a result, the conviction (and penalties) violated either due process or equal protection, under either California or federal law.
Second, the Court committed prejudicial error in trivializing CO’s training deficiencies. This error harmed Appellant, since the Court assumed a role of prosecutor, showing favoritism toward the People. As a result, he suffered an unfair trial, violating either due process or equal protection, under either California or federal law.
Third, the Court committed prejudicial error by intentionally misinterpreting a response to Appellant’s Informal Discovery Request. This error harmed Appellant, since the Court assumed a role of prosecutor, showing favoritism to the People. As a result, he suffered an unfair trial, violating either due process or equal protection, under either California or federal law.
Fourth, the Court committed prejudicial error by denying Appellant a one-week continuance for document review, since his request constituted “good cause.” This error harmed Appellant’s preparation of his defense, violating either due process or equal protection, under either California or federal law.
Lastly, the Court committed prejudicial error by asking CO a leading question about RADAR. This error harmed Appellant, since the Court assumed a role of prosecutor, showing favoritism toward the People. As a result, he suffered an unfair trial, violating either due process or equal protection, under either California or federal law.
ARGUMENT: LACK OF SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
The appellate court can review this portion of Appellant’s appeal without deference to the lower court, since “the existence or nonexistence of substantial evidence is a question of law” {Mau v. Hollywood Commercial Buildings, Inc., 194 Cal. App. 2d 459, 466 (1961)}.
I. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY OF VEHICLE CODE 22348(B), SINCE NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SHOWED THAT HE HAD DRIVEN GREATER THAN 100 MPH ON A HIGHWAY
A. A VISUAL ESTIMATE OF SPEED OF AN UNKNOWN VEHICLE FAILED TO SHOW THAT DEFENDANT HAD TRAVELED AT EITHER 110 MPH OR ANOTHER SPEED
The Court erred in finding Appellant guilty of Vehicle Code 22348(b), since no visual-estimate-of-speed evidence supported that finding.
Citing Officer (“CO”) visually estimated speed of the Subject Vehicle (at a distance much greater than 1000 ft.), before he knew its characteristics (color, size, class, etc.). In fact, under cross examination, CO admitted to a visual estimate of (1) a Subject Vehicle, not a “silver vehicle,” (2) a Subject Vehicle, not a “silver sedan," and (3) a Subject Vehicle, not a “silver Nissan Sentra."
By not tying the single, visual estimate of 110 m.p.h. to a silver, Nissan Sentra, CO failed to show that the visual estimate belonged to Appellant’s vehicle. CO’s testimony merely established that some vehicle, of unknown color, unknown size and unknown class, had driven approximately 110 m.p.h on a highway. That testimony failed to show that Appellant had violated VC 22348(b).
B. THE CITING OFFICER’S VISUAL ESTIMATE LACKED SUPPORT FROM HIS TRAINING
The Court erred in accepting the CO’s visual estimation of speed, since his training did not support such an estimate. Shortly before trial, Appellant received documents from the CO, detailing his visual-estimation-of-speed training. CO subsequently admitted, under cross examination, that he had visually estimated the unknown Subject Vehicle from a distance much greater than 1000 ft. Nevertheless, the CO also admitted, under cross examination, that his most recent visual-estimation-of-speed training, from more than (14) fourteen years earlier, involved no distance greater than 900 ft. Therefore, the CO’s visual estimate of 110 m.p.h. could not reasonably support a conviction of 22348(b), since the visual estimate occurred at a distance not supported by CO’s training.
C. ELECTRONIC SPEED MEASUREMENTS OF AN UNKNOWN VEHICLE FAILED TO SHOW THAT DEFENDANT’S VEHICLE TRAVELED AT 109 MPH, AT 110 MPH OR AT ANOTHER SPEED
The Court erred in finding Appellant guilty of Vehicle Code 22348(b), since no electronic speed measurements supported that finding. According to both CO’s notes and testimony, RADAR readings captured an unidentified Subject Vehicle’s speeds from a distance of at least 1000 ft. Appellant subsequently informed the Court that, at that range, the RADAR beam covered all lanes of I-15N. Afterwards, neither the Court nor the CO contested Appellant’s information.
Under cross examination, CO testified that, before obtaining either RADAR reading, he had not identified the Subject Vehicle by its characteristics (color, size, class, etc.). As a result, the CO failed to show that those RADAR readings belonged to Appellant’s silver, Nissan Sentra. Instead, the CO’s testimony merely established that, while in some lane, some vehicle, of unknown color, unknown size and unknown class, had driven either 109 m.p.h. or 110 m.p.h. That testimony failed to show that Appellant violated VC 22348(b).
D. CITING OFFICER FAILED TO SHOW A CONSTANT VISUAL ON THE SUBJECT VEHICLE
Before changing his story, CO testified that, while traveling in a #3 lane, the unidentified Subject Vehicle passed several vehicles. Thereafter, Appellant presented a video, showing his silver, Nissan Sentra’s traveling a significant distance in a #4 lane. The video also showed Appellant’s vehicle’s traveling in a #3 lane (after moving from the #4 lane), without any vehicles present on either side of his silver, Nissan Sentra. Therefore, CO had to have seen his Subject Vehicle’s traveling in a #3 lane earlier.
If that vehicle were Appellant’s vehicle, and CO had kept a constant visual on it, he would have said so. His testimony would have looked something similar to:
**Beginning of Hypothetical Testimony**
“While traveling in a #3 lane, the Subject Vehicle traveled fast, while passing several vehicles. I visually estimated its speed at 110 m.p.h. Shortly thereafter, I activated my rear RADAR, obtaining speed readings of 109 m.p.h. and 110 m.p.h. The Subject Vehicle subsequently moved from the #3 lane to a #4 lane, traveling for some time therein. Afterwards, the Subject Vehicle moved from the #4 lane to the #3 lane, passing by my patrol unit shortly thereafter.”
**End of Hypothetical Testimony**
But CO provided no such testimony, at least not at first. After seeing defendant’s video, however, CO changed his story, claiming he had seen the Subject Vehicle in the #4 lane all along. Nevertheless, his original testimony provided a better indicator of truth, reflecting his personal recollection of events. (His revision should be ignored, since it emerged after an introduction of video evidence unfavorable to his initial story).
Earlier, CO admitted to speed measurements (both visual and electronic) of an unknown Subject Vehicle, not of a vehicle identified by its characteristics (color, size, class, etc.). He had also admitted that, for sometime thereafter, the Subject Vehicle enjoyed access to Exit 138.
Here, the CO failed to show a “constant visual” on the unknown Subject Vehicle. Therefore, the CO did not provide a seamless narrative that connected the Subject Vehicle to Appellant’s vehicle. Without providing an uninterrupted connection, the CO failed to show that Appellant had driven his silver, Nissan Sentra at greater than 100 m.p.h.
D. A MERE “USAGE” OF RADAR FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT DEFENDANT’S VEHICLE EXCEEDED 100 M.P.H. ON A HIGHWAY
Given CO’s deficient testimony, the Court asked (while looking at Appellant’s video), “Is that white speck there you?" “Yes, or it could be from a different stop," said the CO. The Court then asked, “Did you use RADAR on Appellant’s vehicle there? “Yes,” said the CO.
But the CO failed to follow up his “yes" with a speed reading. Therefore, his (coached) testimony established nothing legally significant.
These facts still remained unchanged: The only RADAR readings on record (109 m.p.h. and 110 m.p.h). had come not only from a distance of at least 1000 ft., but also from an unidentified Subject Vehicle. No RADAR reading on record had come from a vehicle identified by its characteristics (color, size, class, etc.). Therefore, mere RADAR “usage” on Appellant’s vehicle (as it passed by the patrol unit) failed to show that he had exceeded 100 m.p.h. on a highway. All CO’s testimony showed was that, as Appellant’s vehicle had passed by, the RADAR unit displayed some speed.
Of course, inferences may constitute substantial evidence. Here’s the Court’s apparent reasoning and inference in this case:
**Beginning of Court’s Apparent Reasoning and Inference**
RADAR was used on Appellant’s vehicle as it passed by the patrol unit, although the CO did not establish that his patrol vehicle even appeared in Appellant’s video. What’s more, the CO failed to state what speed reading was displayed on the RADAR unit at that moment. Therefore, Appellant drove greater than 100 m.p.h. on a highway.
**End of Example of Court’s Apparent Reasoning and Inference**
Such reasoning is absurd, since mere “usage” of RADAR could mean that the CO had obtained a speed measurement not greater than 100 m.p.h. For that reason, the court’s inference failed to pass tests of both logic and reasonableness {Roddenberry v. Roddenberry, 44 Cal. App. 4th 634, 651-52 (1996)} That inference was, therefore, not a reasonable basis for finding Appellant guilty of exceeding 100 m.p.h. on a highway.
Conclusion
The entire record shows that some vehicle, of unknown color, unknown size, and unknown class had exceeded 100 m.p.h. CO not only obtained all speed measurements from an unknown Subject Vehicle, but also from a distance not supported by his training. Even worse, he failed to connect any speed measurements to Appellant’s silver, Nissan Sentra (or to any specific vehicle).
CO’s only “evidence” came after coaching by the Court. That “evidence” did not support an infraction violation, however, since CO merely established RADAR “usage." No speed measurement was provided, rendering the affirmation of “usage” useless for a conviction of VC 22348(b).
Given that the horrendous quality of evidence against Appellant is “wholly unacceptable to reasonable minds," no rational fact finder could have found Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt (Kircher v. Atchison, T. & SF Railway Co., 32 Cal. 2d 176 - Cal: Supreme Court 1948).
As a result, Appellant suffered a conviction, based on a lack of substantial evidence. That conviction violated either due process or equal protection under either California or federal law {CA Constitution: Article 1, Section 7}, {People v. Johnson 26 Cal.3d 557, 578. (1980)}, {US Constitution: 14th Amendment}, {Jackson v. Virginia 443 U.S. 307. (1979)}. For those reasons, Appellant’s conviction demands a reversal.
Only (1), (2), (3) & (4) appeal below. Other parts are "under construction."
Overview:
(1) Summary of Facts
(2) Questions Presented
(3) Summary of Arguments
(4) Argument: Lack of Substantial Evidence
(5) Argument: Prejudicial Error {Citing Officer’s Training}
(6) Argument: Prejudicial Error {Informal Discovery Request}
(7) Argument: Prejudicial Error {Denial of Continuance}
(8) Argument: Prejudicial Error {Leading Question about RADAR}
SUMMARY OF FACTS
Preliminary Issues
Before trial, Appellant served an Informal Discovery Request on San Bernardino County’s District Attorney. But it failed to respond. Thereafter, Appellant served Citing Officer’s agency. Most documents were mailed to Appellant. But some were not, including CO’s certifications in RADAR or visual-estimation of speed. Shortly before trial, however, CO presented Appellant with the missing documents. Appellant then requested a one-week continuance for document review. But the Court denied the request. Instead, Appellant (in Pro Per) received a short recess, not only to examine multiple pages of new information, but also to figure out how to use them for cross-examination questions.
The Court subsequently reviewed Appellant’s Informal Discovery Request. One request sought “Names & addresses of prosecution witnesses likely to testify at trial.” CO’s agency’s responded in writing with “none." After reading “none” aloud, the Court pointed at the CO, saying, “That’s him.”
Citation and Trial
Citation Date: XXX
Citing Agency: XXX
Citing Officer: XXX (“CO")
Appellant’s Vehicle: Silver, Nissan Sentra
Trial Date: XXX
Hiding behind a mountain-like structure on I-15N, Citing Officer (“CO”) sat in a stationary patrol unit, using his driver’s side mirror to watch northbound traffic. From a substantial distance, CO saw a northbound “Subject Vehicle” (of unknown characteristics), not only traveling fast in a #3 lane, but also passing several vehicles. CO visually estimated the Subject Vehicle’s speed at 110 m.p.h. Thereafter, he activated rear RADAR, obtaining speeds of 109 m.p.h and 110 m.p.h. Much later, CO stopped a silver, Nissan Sentra, issuing a citation for an infraction violation of Vehicle Code 22348(b): Driving a vehicle at greater than 100 m.p.h. on a Highway.
Under cross examination, CO testified that, although his notes mentioned “1000 ft.,” he had obtained speed measurements of the Subject Vehicle at “probably much greater than 1000 ft.”
CO also admitted a couple of weaknesses. First, his most recent visual-estimation-of-speed training had occurred more than (14) fourteen years before citation date. Second, he lacked training in visual estimation of speed at a distance greater than 900 ft. The Court subsequently trivialized those deficiencies, asserting that the CO had performed many visual estimations of speed as a CHP officer.
CO went on to admit that, before obtaining any speed measurements (whether visual or electronic), he had not identified the Subject Vehicle by its characteristics (color, size, class, etc.).
Appellant then informed the Court that, in obtaining electronic speed readings (of both 109 m.p.h. and 110 m.p.h), CO had used RADAR at least 1000 ft. away. At that distance, the RADAR’s beam covered all lanes of I-15N. Neither the CO nor the Court contested Appellant’s information.
Thereafter, CO admitted he had not testified that (a) the Subject Vehicle had left the #3 lane, (b) had ever spent time in a #4 lane, or (c) had ever moved from the #4 lane to the #3 lane. Finally, CO admitted that Exit #138 was available to the Subject Vehicle.
Appellant went on to present video, showing his silver, Nissan Sentra’s traveling in the #4 lane. The video also showed Appellant’s vehicle’s traveling in the #3 lane (after switching from the #4 lane), without passing any vehicles.
Thereafter, the Court asked (while referring to Appellant’s video), “Is that white speck there you?" “Yes, or it could be from a different stop,” said the CO. The Court then asked, “Did you use RADAR there?" After CO said, “yes," the Court found Appellant guilty of CVC 22348(b).
Questions Presented
I. DID THE COURT CONVICT DEFENDANT OF VEHICLE CODE 22348(B), DESPITE A LACK OF SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE?
II. DID A TRIVIALIZING OF CITING OFFICER’S TRAINING DEFICIENCIES CONSTITUTE PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY THE COURT?
III. DID A CLAIM THAT “NONE” MEANT “THE CITING OFFICER” CONSTITUTE PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY THE COURT?
IV. DID A DENIAL OF A CONTINUANCE FOR DOCUMENT REVIEW CONSTITUTE PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY THE COURT?
V. DID A LEADING QUESTION ABOUT RADAR CONSTITUTE PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY THE COURT?
Summary of Argument
First, the Court erred in convicting defendant of CVC 22348(b), since no substantial evidence supported that finding. As a result, the conviction (and penalties) violated either due process or equal protection, under either California or federal law.
Second, the Court committed prejudicial error in trivializing CO’s training deficiencies. This error harmed Appellant, since the Court assumed a role of prosecutor, showing favoritism toward the People. As a result, he suffered an unfair trial, violating either due process or equal protection, under either California or federal law.
Third, the Court committed prejudicial error by intentionally misinterpreting a response to Appellant’s Informal Discovery Request. This error harmed Appellant, since the Court assumed a role of prosecutor, showing favoritism to the People. As a result, he suffered an unfair trial, violating either due process or equal protection, under either California or federal law.
Fourth, the Court committed prejudicial error by denying Appellant a one-week continuance for document review, since his request constituted “good cause.” This error harmed Appellant’s preparation of his defense, violating either due process or equal protection, under either California or federal law.
Lastly, the Court committed prejudicial error by asking CO a leading question about RADAR. This error harmed Appellant, since the Court assumed a role of prosecutor, showing favoritism toward the People. As a result, he suffered an unfair trial, violating either due process or equal protection, under either California or federal law.
ARGUMENT: LACK OF SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
The appellate court can review this portion of Appellant’s appeal without deference to the lower court, since “the existence or nonexistence of substantial evidence is a question of law” {Mau v. Hollywood Commercial Buildings, Inc., 194 Cal. App. 2d 459, 466 (1961)}.
I. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY OF VEHICLE CODE 22348(B), SINCE NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SHOWED THAT HE HAD DRIVEN GREATER THAN 100 MPH ON A HIGHWAY
A. A VISUAL ESTIMATE OF SPEED OF AN UNKNOWN VEHICLE FAILED TO SHOW THAT DEFENDANT HAD TRAVELED AT EITHER 110 MPH OR ANOTHER SPEED
The Court erred in finding Appellant guilty of Vehicle Code 22348(b), since no visual-estimate-of-speed evidence supported that finding.
Citing Officer (“CO”) visually estimated speed of the Subject Vehicle (at a distance much greater than 1000 ft.), before he knew its characteristics (color, size, class, etc.). In fact, under cross examination, CO admitted to a visual estimate of (1) a Subject Vehicle, not a “silver vehicle,” (2) a Subject Vehicle, not a “silver sedan," and (3) a Subject Vehicle, not a “silver Nissan Sentra."
By not tying the single, visual estimate of 110 m.p.h. to a silver, Nissan Sentra, CO failed to show that the visual estimate belonged to Appellant’s vehicle. CO’s testimony merely established that some vehicle, of unknown color, unknown size and unknown class, had driven approximately 110 m.p.h on a highway. That testimony failed to show that Appellant had violated VC 22348(b).
B. THE CITING OFFICER’S VISUAL ESTIMATE LACKED SUPPORT FROM HIS TRAINING
The Court erred in accepting the CO’s visual estimation of speed, since his training did not support such an estimate. Shortly before trial, Appellant received documents from the CO, detailing his visual-estimation-of-speed training. CO subsequently admitted, under cross examination, that he had visually estimated the unknown Subject Vehicle from a distance much greater than 1000 ft. Nevertheless, the CO also admitted, under cross examination, that his most recent visual-estimation-of-speed training, from more than (14) fourteen years earlier, involved no distance greater than 900 ft. Therefore, the CO’s visual estimate of 110 m.p.h. could not reasonably support a conviction of 22348(b), since the visual estimate occurred at a distance not supported by CO’s training.
C. ELECTRONIC SPEED MEASUREMENTS OF AN UNKNOWN VEHICLE FAILED TO SHOW THAT DEFENDANT’S VEHICLE TRAVELED AT 109 MPH, AT 110 MPH OR AT ANOTHER SPEED
The Court erred in finding Appellant guilty of Vehicle Code 22348(b), since no electronic speed measurements supported that finding. According to both CO’s notes and testimony, RADAR readings captured an unidentified Subject Vehicle’s speeds from a distance of at least 1000 ft. Appellant subsequently informed the Court that, at that range, the RADAR beam covered all lanes of I-15N. Afterwards, neither the Court nor the CO contested Appellant’s information.
Under cross examination, CO testified that, before obtaining either RADAR reading, he had not identified the Subject Vehicle by its characteristics (color, size, class, etc.). As a result, the CO failed to show that those RADAR readings belonged to Appellant’s silver, Nissan Sentra. Instead, the CO’s testimony merely established that, while in some lane, some vehicle, of unknown color, unknown size and unknown class, had driven either 109 m.p.h. or 110 m.p.h. That testimony failed to show that Appellant violated VC 22348(b).
D. CITING OFFICER FAILED TO SHOW A CONSTANT VISUAL ON THE SUBJECT VEHICLE
Before changing his story, CO testified that, while traveling in a #3 lane, the unidentified Subject Vehicle passed several vehicles. Thereafter, Appellant presented a video, showing his silver, Nissan Sentra’s traveling a significant distance in a #4 lane. The video also showed Appellant’s vehicle’s traveling in a #3 lane (after moving from the #4 lane), without any vehicles present on either side of his silver, Nissan Sentra. Therefore, CO had to have seen his Subject Vehicle’s traveling in a #3 lane earlier.
If that vehicle were Appellant’s vehicle, and CO had kept a constant visual on it, he would have said so. His testimony would have looked something similar to:
**Beginning of Hypothetical Testimony**
“While traveling in a #3 lane, the Subject Vehicle traveled fast, while passing several vehicles. I visually estimated its speed at 110 m.p.h. Shortly thereafter, I activated my rear RADAR, obtaining speed readings of 109 m.p.h. and 110 m.p.h. The Subject Vehicle subsequently moved from the #3 lane to a #4 lane, traveling for some time therein. Afterwards, the Subject Vehicle moved from the #4 lane to the #3 lane, passing by my patrol unit shortly thereafter.”
**End of Hypothetical Testimony**
But CO provided no such testimony, at least not at first. After seeing defendant’s video, however, CO changed his story, claiming he had seen the Subject Vehicle in the #4 lane all along. Nevertheless, his original testimony provided a better indicator of truth, reflecting his personal recollection of events. (His revision should be ignored, since it emerged after an introduction of video evidence unfavorable to his initial story).
Earlier, CO admitted to speed measurements (both visual and electronic) of an unknown Subject Vehicle, not of a vehicle identified by its characteristics (color, size, class, etc.). He had also admitted that, for sometime thereafter, the Subject Vehicle enjoyed access to Exit 138.
Here, the CO failed to show a “constant visual” on the unknown Subject Vehicle. Therefore, the CO did not provide a seamless narrative that connected the Subject Vehicle to Appellant’s vehicle. Without providing an uninterrupted connection, the CO failed to show that Appellant had driven his silver, Nissan Sentra at greater than 100 m.p.h.
D. A MERE “USAGE” OF RADAR FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT DEFENDANT’S VEHICLE EXCEEDED 100 M.P.H. ON A HIGHWAY
Given CO’s deficient testimony, the Court asked (while looking at Appellant’s video), “Is that white speck there you?" “Yes, or it could be from a different stop," said the CO. The Court then asked, “Did you use RADAR on Appellant’s vehicle there? “Yes,” said the CO.
But the CO failed to follow up his “yes" with a speed reading. Therefore, his (coached) testimony established nothing legally significant.
These facts still remained unchanged: The only RADAR readings on record (109 m.p.h. and 110 m.p.h). had come not only from a distance of at least 1000 ft., but also from an unidentified Subject Vehicle. No RADAR reading on record had come from a vehicle identified by its characteristics (color, size, class, etc.). Therefore, mere RADAR “usage” on Appellant’s vehicle (as it passed by the patrol unit) failed to show that he had exceeded 100 m.p.h. on a highway. All CO’s testimony showed was that, as Appellant’s vehicle had passed by, the RADAR unit displayed some speed.
Of course, inferences may constitute substantial evidence. Here’s the Court’s apparent reasoning and inference in this case:
**Beginning of Court’s Apparent Reasoning and Inference**
RADAR was used on Appellant’s vehicle as it passed by the patrol unit, although the CO did not establish that his patrol vehicle even appeared in Appellant’s video. What’s more, the CO failed to state what speed reading was displayed on the RADAR unit at that moment. Therefore, Appellant drove greater than 100 m.p.h. on a highway.
**End of Example of Court’s Apparent Reasoning and Inference**
Such reasoning is absurd, since mere “usage” of RADAR could mean that the CO had obtained a speed measurement not greater than 100 m.p.h. For that reason, the court’s inference failed to pass tests of both logic and reasonableness {Roddenberry v. Roddenberry, 44 Cal. App. 4th 634, 651-52 (1996)} That inference was, therefore, not a reasonable basis for finding Appellant guilty of exceeding 100 m.p.h. on a highway.
Conclusion
The entire record shows that some vehicle, of unknown color, unknown size, and unknown class had exceeded 100 m.p.h. CO not only obtained all speed measurements from an unknown Subject Vehicle, but also from a distance not supported by his training. Even worse, he failed to connect any speed measurements to Appellant’s silver, Nissan Sentra (or to any specific vehicle).
CO’s only “evidence” came after coaching by the Court. That “evidence” did not support an infraction violation, however, since CO merely established RADAR “usage." No speed measurement was provided, rendering the affirmation of “usage” useless for a conviction of VC 22348(b).
Given that the horrendous quality of evidence against Appellant is “wholly unacceptable to reasonable minds," no rational fact finder could have found Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt (Kircher v. Atchison, T. & SF Railway Co., 32 Cal. 2d 176 - Cal: Supreme Court 1948).
As a result, Appellant suffered a conviction, based on a lack of substantial evidence. That conviction violated either due process or equal protection under either California or federal law {CA Constitution: Article 1, Section 7}, {People v. Johnson 26 Cal.3d 557, 578. (1980)}, {US Constitution: 14th Amendment}, {Jackson v. Virginia 443 U.S. 307. (1979)}. For those reasons, Appellant’s conviction demands a reversal.
Appeals: My Bros: Critique Part of My Appeal of a Speeding Tickets
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